Why Consociationalism and Devolution Surpass Geographical Federalism in Eritrea.

26/11/2025 18:38 PM

The Wrong Medicine for the Wrong Illness:
Why Consociationalism and Devolution Surpass Geographical Federalism in Eritrea. A Rejoinder to Dr. Negassi Hadgu¹*

By Dr. Gebre Gebremariam

The Wrong Medicine for the Wrong Illness: Why Consociationalism and Devolution Surpass Geographical Federalism in Eritrea.
A Rejoinder to Dr. Negassi Hadgu*¹
Dr. Gebre Gebremariam

The Context: The Peril of Misidentifying the Void

I welcome Dr. Negassi Hadgu’s rejoinder, “The Indivisibility of Structure and Substance,” as it allows us to sharpen the focus of this crucial national debate. Dr. Negassi argues with academic eloquence that institutions shape behavior and that a unitary structure inherently predisposes a nation toward tyranny. He accuses my previous analysis of creating a “false dichotomy” between structure and substance, invoking the school of “new institutionalism” to validate his prescription of Geographical Federalism.

However, in doing so, "Dr. Negassi misses the mark not because of a difference in preference, but because of a fundamental misdiagnosis of the Eritrean crisis. By focusing heavily on the spatial arrangement of power (federal vs. unitary), he overlooks the fundamental reality of the Eritrean crisis: the total absence of the rule of law and the arrest of state construction itself. In essence, he treats the symptoms of centralization while ignoring the underlying pathology. The debate is not merely about how to slice the cake of sovereignty; it is about the fact that there is no table on which to place it.

My contention remains that Dr. Negassi’s diagnosis is theoretical rather than grounded in the grim reality of the Eritrean “non-state.” His medicine attempts to construct the roof of a house whose foundation has yet to be laid. Instead of a premature federal arrangement, I propose that Consociational Democracy - featuring a Proportional Representation (PR) electoral system, a bicameral parliamentary system, and a democratic devolved unitary state - offers the only viable path to restore the state and ensure stability.

The Institutional Void: You Cannot Federate a Vacuum

Dr. Negassi invokes “new institutionalism” to argue that structures determine democratic outcomes. While this is true in functioning polities, it fails to account for the Eritrean anomaly. The PFDJ regime is not a “hyper-centralized unitary state” in the traditional political science sense; it is a predatory clique that has hijacked the state. The PFDJ did not become tyrannical because the legal structure allowed it; rather, they entrenched their tyranny by refusing to implement the ratified constitution, precluding the existence of a parliament, and governing through rule by fiat in the total absence of rule-based governance. They would have done the exact same thing under a federal constitution.

The primary deficit in Eritrea is not the concentration of state power, but the lack of a democratic state entirely. State construction and nation-building are “under arrest.” We lack the basic DNA of governance: a constitution, independent courts, a free press, and civil society.

Nonetheless, Dr. Negassi argues that federalism is the "necessary medicine" to prevent the return of dictatorship. However, William H. Riker, in his seminal work Federalism: Origins, Operations and Significance, establishes that federalism is essentially a political bargain between politicians who wish to expand their territorial control and those who wish to retain some independence (Riker 1964). This "federal bargain" presumes the existence of legitimate political actors and a functioning state apparatus capable of negotiation and enforcement. Eritrea currently possesses neither.

Hence, to argue that “Geographical Federalism” is the solution is to assume that we have functioning institutions capable of adjudicating complex federal disputes. We do not. As B.C. Smith notes in Decentralization: The Territorial Dimension of the State, the territorial distribution of power requires a stable center to manage the tension between national unity and local autonomy (Smith 1985). Introducing a rigid federal structure into a political vacuum, before establishing the basic supremacy of the rule of law, invites fragmentation, not democracy.

The Fallacy of “Structural Predisposition” and the Consociational Alternative

Dr. Negassi asserts that a unitary state is “structurally predisposed” to authoritarianism. This is a reductionist view that ignores the success of unitary democracies worldwide (e.g., Japan, France, the Scandinavian countries). The “irresistible prize” of total control exists only when there are no checks and balances.

The antidote to the PFDJ’s tyranny is not to chop the state into nine pieces (Awrajas), but to subject the state to the rule of law. A democratic, devolved unitary state with a robust separation of powers creates the “veto players” Dr. Negassi desires without risking the paralysis of a fragile post-conflict nation.

Dr. Negassi argues that his proposed nine regions will create “cross-cutting cleavages.” However, the literature suggests that territorializing politics in a post-conflict society is dangerous. As Ugo M. Amoretti and Nancy Bermeo highlight in Federalism and Territorial Cleavages, federal arrangements often freeze territorial identities and can exacerbate conflict rather than resolve it (Amoretti and Bermeo 2004).

Instead of rigid geography, I advocate for Consociational Democracy. This model relies on power-sharing at the center, ensuring that all segments of society are represented without fragmenting the state into competing fiefdoms. This is where Proportional Representation (PR) becomes vital. Unlike the winner-take-all systems often associated with majoritarian federalism, PR ensures that minority voices are heard in the national legislature regardless of where they live. Combined with a bicameral parliamentary system - where an upper house can represent regional interests and a lower house represents the population - we can also achieve the "veto players" Dr. Negassi desires without the risks of balkanization. This aligns with Ferran Requejo and Miquel Caminal’s analysis that democratic constitutionalism in plurinational contexts requires flexible accommodation rather than rigid territorial compartmentalization (Requejo and Caminal 2011). Consociationalism achieves this through cooperation, whereas Dr. Negassi’s federalism risks creating regional fiefdoms where governors become local tyrants - a phenomenon of “local authoritarian enclaves” or the “Tyranny of Small Places” observed in federal systems globally (Katz and Tarr 1996).

Economic Viability and the Mirage of Fiscal Federalism

Dr. Negassi counters the objection regarding economic viability by proposing “Fiscal Federalism” and revenue sharing. While this model is theoretically sound in advanced economies like Germany or Canada, applying it to the current Eritrean reality is a dangerous gamble. Dr. Negassi’s Geographical Federalism divides the country based on history and identity, not economics. This inevitably creates a “Mismatch Trap” between “have” and “have-not” regions, which Fiscal Federalism is intended to patch. However, if the economic gap between the “haves” (e.g., regions possessing ports like Massawa and Assab) and the “have-nots” (inland regions) is too wide, the mandatory fiscal transfers required to equalize them become so large that they are politically toxic.

Furthermore, this proposal introduces a fatal structural paradox. For Fiscal Federalism to work effectively - for instance, to ensure that the regions of Akele Guzay or Seraye receive their fair share of port revenue from Semhar or Denkalia - the state requires an extremely strong central government with the power to extract wealth from one region and redistribute it to another. Yet, federalists like Dr. Negassi often advocate for a weaker center to prevent tyranny. If the central government is weak, the resource-rich regions will simply refuse to share their wealth, leading to gridlock.

This risk is compounded by the location of natural resources. In a Geographic Federation, assets such as gold, potash, and ports fall within specific regional boundaries. Without a prevailing unitary philosophy that “all resources belong to the people,” Fiscal Federalism transforms into a battleground. Regions will inevitably argue that they own the resources within their territory, treating income as “Regional Revenue” rather than “National Revenue.” The center’s attempt to tax these assets for redistribution will lead to constant friction and resource-based conflict.

Beyond these structural risks, we must address the institutional void. Fiscal federalism is not self-executing; it requires a highly sophisticated, transparent, and accountable central bureaucracy to collect, audit, and redistribute resources, as well as a high degree of trust between the center and the periphery. In a post-PFDJ Eritrea, where the economy has been decimated, these conditions simply do not exist. Creating nine separate administrations with “constitutional authority to manage local resources” in this vacuum is a recipe for entrenched inequality.

The “historical Awrajas” Dr. Negassi champions face severe developmental disparities. To lock them into a rigid federal arrangement now would condemn resource-poor regions to perpetual dependency or spark conflict over resource-rich borders. As Mwangi S. Kimenyi and Patrick Meagher argue in Devolution and Development, devolution in developing states offers a more pragmatic framework (Kimenyi and Meagher 2004). A Democratic Devolved Unitary State brings decision-making closer to the people while maintaining the state's capacity to drive national development. It allows for the fluid mobilization of national resources to rebuild all of Eritrea without being hindered by rigid jurisdictional walls or the reform blockades often found in federal systems (Wachendorfer-Schmidt 2000).

The Question of Sovereignty: Concession vs. Will

Dr. Negassi argues that in a unitary state, regional autonomy is a “revocable concession,” whereas federalism offers a “permanent division of power.” This argument misses the essence of democratic sovereignty. In a true democracy, ultimate sovereignty resides with the people, not the government. If the Eritrean people, through a democratic process, choose to devolve power, that is not a “concession” - it is the will of the sovereign.

The danger of Dr. Negassi’s “permanent” federalism is that it locks a traumatized, transitional society into a rigid structure that may not fit. If the federal arrangement fails - if it leads to gridlock or ethnic balkanization - it is incredibly difficult to undo without violence. A devolved unitary system offers flexibility. It allows the state to stabilize, build democratic capacity, and gradually decentralize as institutions mature (Smith 1985).

Furthermore, Dr. Negassi’s dismissal of the Yugoslavia scenario is too hasty. He claims his regions are “multi-ethnic” and therefore safe. But in the absence of a strong national identity and rule of law, political entrepreneurs can and will weaponize regional identities, turning “geographical” federalism into de facto ethnic conflict. Jan Erk’s Explaining Federalism reminds us that social structure drives federalism, not the other way around; we must heal the social structure before imposing a federal map (Erk 2008).

The Thesis: First the Foundation, Then the House

Dr. Negassi’s prescription suffers from a fatal fundamental diagnostic error. He perceives the Eritrean problem as one of structural design - specifically, the centralization of power - when the true problem is the nature of governance itself: the complete absence of rule of law and the arrest of state construction. Hence, he is attempting to solve the problem of tyranny with the tool of geography, when the true solution is legality and inclusive representation.

The “correct medicine” for Eritrea is the immediate establishment of a constitutional order that guarantees basic human rights, establishes an independent judiciary, and subjects the military to civilian control. This is the “rule-based governance” that is currently missing. Once the state is released from “arrest” and democratic institutions are functioning, we can rely on a Consociational framework - buttressed by Proportional Representation and a Bicameral Parliament - to ensure fair governance. This approach, supported by the extensive literature on state-building and decentralization, avoids the pitfalls of premature federalism while ensuring that power is shared, rights are protected, and the state is finally released from its arrest.

To impose a complex federal structure now, amidst the ruins of the PFDJ’s lawlessness, is to invite chaos. We must build the democratic state first; only then can we decide how to house it.

Footnotes

1 It is imperative to underscore that this ongoing exchange with Dr. Negassi is not a personal “tit-for-tat,” but a vital dialectic on the foundational architecture of the post-PFDJ state. The structural paradigms we are debating - constitutionalism, federalism, and the nature of sovereignty - carry profound and irrevocable ramifications for the future stability of our nation. Consequently, this discourse cannot remain a dialogue between two; the stakes are simply too high. I earnestly call upon fellow Eritrean scholars, intellectuals, and experts to enter this arena and subject these ideas to further scrutiny. The task of designing Eritrea’s future demands the full weight of our collective intellect

References

Amoretti, Ugo M., and Nancy Bermeo, eds. 2004. Federalism and Territorial Cleavages. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Erk, Jan. 2008. Explaining Federalism: State, Society and Congruence in Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany and Switzerland. London: Routledge.
Katz, Ellis, and G. Alan Tarr, eds. 1996. Federalism and Rights. Rowman & Littlefield.
Kimenyi, Mwangi S., and Patrick Meagher, eds. 2004. Devolution and Development: Governance Prospects in Decentralizing States. Ashgate Publishing.
Requejo, Ferran, and Miquel Caminal, eds. 2011. Federalism, Plurinationality and Democratic Constitutionalism. London: Routledge.
Riker, William H. 1964. Federalism: Origins, Operations and Significance. Boston: Little, Brown.
Smith, B.C. 1985. Decentralization: The Territorial Dimension of the State. London: Allen & Unwin.
Wachendorfer-Schmidt, Ute, ed. 2000. Federalism and Political Performance. London: Routledge.

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The Wrong Medicine for the Wrong Illness: Why Consociationalism and Devolution Surpass Geographical Federalism in Eritrea. A Rejoinder to Dr. Negassi Hadgu*1

By Dr. Gebre Gebremariam

Snitna: Code of Conduct — መርበብ ሓበሬታና ዝምራሓሉ መትከላት

The Wrong Medicine for the Wrong Illness:
Why Consociationalism and Devolution Surpass Geographical Federalism in Eritrea. A Rejoinder to Dr. Negassi Hadgu¹*